A review and outlook by our expert on the Middle East, GERHARD ARNOLD, Würzburg
Almost exactly two years after its beginning on 7 October 2023, the bloodiest and most destructive Middle East war to date has come to an end. It began with a major offensive by Hamas, the most powerful Palestinian faction, and aimed to destroy Israel as a functioning state, not only through attacks on a music festival and several kibbutzim, but primarily through swarm rocket attacks. It has ended with a catastrophic defeat for Hamas and widespread destruction of the Gaza Strip, with around 70,000 Palestinians killed, their deaths having been cold-bloodedly calculated by the Hamas leadership. It is not yet clear that the ceasefire of 10 October 2025 will hold, especially as it has not been signed by either party to the conflict.
Looking back, one must acknowledge the tireless and determined efforts of the most influential Arab states, and the United States, to end the Gaza war as well as the suffering of the people affected, Palestinians and Israelis alike. These efforts deserve recognition, even if they had only limited initial success in the two years since the war began, and the agreement to end the conflict is yet to prove lasting. But the ceasefire, albeit very patchy, is holding reasonably well.
“The ceasefire, albeit very patchy, is holding reasonably well.”
Various peace initiatives of Arab States…
The Arab League with its 22 members and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) with its 57 member states, to name the most important, also held a series of conferences. However, apart from sharp anti-Israeli rhetoric, they produced few practical results in terms of ending the conflict.
However, Egypt and Qatar on the one hand, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as an independent actor on the other, did make some progress. As a direct neighbour of the Gaza Strip, Egypt was directly affected by the war, both politically and psychologically but also because of the unpredictable impact of the fighting there on its own territory. For its part, Qatar has long projected itself as a willing crisis mediator with excellent relations with Hamas and providing a refuge for Hamas’ political leadership in its wealthy Gulf emirate.
…but no practical solutions for ending the Gaza war
It quickly became apparent that Egypt and Qatar were the only Arab states capable and determined enough to achieve a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas through patient diplomacy. The first one lasted from 24-30 November 2023, and resulted in the release of 70 Israeli hostages. On 1 December 2023, the Israeli army resumed fighting. Its primary goal was to crush Hamas, which was continuing to fire rockets into Israel.
The Arab states were however unwilling to take a crucial decision essential to resolving the Gaza conflict that remains unresolved to this day: the establishment of a joint Arab and international military force to ensure security in the Gaza Strip and force Hamas to disarm. They argued that they did not want to become Israel’s henchmen, but they also feared losses in their own ranks and the ensuing outrage of their own populations.
The challenge of a two-state solution
Their “mantra-like” demand that only a two-state solution could create a lasting peace in the Middle East, however, was to develop a momentum of its own. Because of the war in the Gaza Strip but not in the West Bank, the Arab states had to face the fact that since 2007, there have been two geographically separate Palestinian administrative territories that remain bitterly hostile to one another to this day. A prerequisite for a two-state solution, now considered particularly urgent, was the political unification of the West Bank under the rule of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in Ramallah and the Gaza Strip under the rule of Hamas. The resulting unity government could then have been internationally recognised.
However, after 7 October 2023, the Arab states came to realise that any participation in government by Hamas, which had proven itself once and for all to be a ruthless and inhumane terrorist organisation, was no longer an option in a united Palestinian state. That being the case, the only other option became the extension of the PA government, under current Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, to the Gaza Strip and the political abdication of Hamas.
“After 7 October 2023, the Arab states came to realise that any participation in government by Hamas, which had proven itself once and for all to be a ruthless and inhumane terrorist organisation, was no longer an option in a united Palestinian state”.
American inititiaves
It was US Secretary of State Blinken who publicly expressed this concrete proposal for a united Palestine during a trip to the region in January 2024. However, he also called for a thorough reform of the PA, whose corruption is well known throughout the region.
In 2024, when Qatar and Egypt had failed to reach a new ceasefire, the UAE Foreign Ministry sketched out another way forward, which, at least conceptually, was the only practical solution. It aimed to build on the very positive development of bilateral relations under the 2022 Abraham Accords (normalisation of relations with Israel, establishment of diplomatic relations, and development of close economic cooperation) to bring peace and security to Israel, while at the same time remaining committed to the Palestinian cause.
In the Financial Times of 17 July 2024, Minister of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates, Lana Nusseibeh, presented a well-thought-out peace plan that went far beyond a ceasefire. For the first time, the minister offered to participate in “a temporary international mission” in the Gaza Strip if the US assumed its leadership. Law and order had to be restored, along with a single legitimate Palestinian authority capable of responsible government.
Shortly before the start of President Trump’s second term on 20 January 2025, more ambitious plans were published in various media. Following a permanent ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, the US was prepared to cooperate with the UAE in an interim administration of the territory, including in security matters, paving the way for the PA to take power after “significant reform”. Instead of international peacekeeping troops, “private military contractors” could also provide temporary security. The UAE’s intention was politically bold: it wanted to neutralise “any potential threats” to Israel. Ultimately, this could only mean not only disempowering Hamas politically, but also disarming it.
Practically simultaneously, Qatar and Egypt, with US support, succeeded in reaching a new ceasefire agreement that was intended to gradually bring the war to an end. It entered into force on 19 January 2025, and was initially intended to last for six weeks until 1 March, entailing the release of additional Israeli hostages.
Trump’s irritating plans for Gaza
However, great irritation was caused all round by President Trump’s plan, first announced on 25 January 2025, that the US would take over the Gaza Strip, turn it into a tourist hub and deport all Palestinians to Egypt and Jordan. In response, the Arab League, at its special meeting in Cairo on 4 March 2025, approved an Egyptian plan to combine the recently initiated ceasefire with a comprehensive five-year reconstruction plan.
As a result of the fighting between Israel and Hamas, the Gaza Strip has been largely reduced to rubble with most residents homeless and living in slums. However, the ceasefire of 19 January 2025 did not hold, and Israel resumed hostilities against Hamas on 18 March 2025, to the great dismay of both the West and the Arab world.
In May 2025, a new ceasefire seemed again within reach. Israel agreed after strong pressure from the US, but Hamas refused. It was essentially intended to be a reboot of the previous ceasefire and include the political disempowerment of Hamas.
Fresh momentum
At the same time, preparations were in full swing for a UN conference co-chaired by France and Saudi Arabia in June 2025, which was intended to pave the way for a comprehensive peace with a two-state solution. On 8 June 2025, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas wrote a long letter to the two co-chairs, Emmannuel Macron and Mohammed bin Salman, in which he presented his peace plan.
It basically edorsed the UAE’s previous plans, but maintained maximum demands on Israel (a return to the borders of 1976, Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, full sovereignty, etc.). Once the PA moved to take full control of the Gaza Strip, Hamas would have to hand over its weapons to the PA police so that they could be removed from the area. Hamas could remain a purely political party under the supervision of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which agreed to a temporary international security force in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.
The postponed UN conference in July 2025, with the additional participation of all Arab League states, included these plans in its final resolution. Thus, after one and three-quarter years of war, all League states in the Arab world agreed to a plan of which they had rejected the key points the previous year. By then Hamas, too, had realised that its reign in the Gaza Strip was over.
In August 2025, a second ceasefire between Israel and Hamas seemed within reach once again. It was negotiated between Qatar and Egypt and followed on from that of 19 January 2025. This time, Hamas agreed after strong pressure from Qatar, but Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu did not. Instead, he announced the military occupation of Gaza City and, on 9 September 2025, bombed an office building in Doha, the capital of Qatar, where Hamas’ political leadership was meeting for negotiations. Commentators were quick to conclude that Netanyahu was no longer interested in another ceasefire. The subsequent outrage among the Arab states was understandable.
Trump’s 20-point peace plan
But US President Trump, for whatever serious or less serious reasons, finally made up his mind to end the Gaza conflict. He had quietly abandoned his original plan of January/February 2025 to purchase the Gaza Strip, expel the Palestinians and turn the territory into a tourist hub. Trump was aware of Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s domestic political difficulties, and he also knew that Hamas no longer had any political, let alone military, support among the Arab states. He was therefore able to pile pressure on both sides. As it turned out, with success.
“Trump was aware of Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s domestic political difficulties, and he also knew that Hamas no longer had any political, let alone military, support among the Arab states.”
The result of his efforts, that emerged from many behind the scenes discussions, was the 20-point plan for the Gaza Strip of 29 September 2025. Most Arab states approved it, having already denied Hamas the right to further existence at the UN conference in New York in July 2025.
However, it wasn’t Trump alone, but also the Qatari foreign minister, who forced Hamas to accept Israel’s maximum demands on the hostages in the following days, namely the release of all living and dead hostages immediately after the ceasefire. And Netanyahu, grudgingly and in the teeth of resistance from his extremist right-wing ministers, had to accept that the hated Palestinian Authority in Ramallah would shortly assume political and police power in the Gaza Strip too. Even worse for him: Trump envisioned a two-state solution in paragraph 19. The ceasefire came into effect at noon local time on 10 October 2025, based on the 20-point plan that its author called the “Trump Peace Agreement.”
Outstanding uncertainties
Three days later, on 13 October 2025, a hastily convened Gaza conference took place in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, where a memorandum, drafted by Trump, for peace in the Gaza Strip and the entire Middle East was ceremoniously signed in the presence of a total of 31 heads of state and government. In addition to Donald Trump, the signatories included the Egyptian and Turkish presidents, as well as the Emir of Qatar.
The White House website called the document “The Trump Declaration for Enduring Peace and Prosperity”. When and how this great promise will be fulfilled remains completely unclear.
Our Middle East expert Gerhard Arnold is a German protestant theologian and publicist who has issued numerous monographs and essays on church history, peace ethics and international security policy. © private
